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MOOTNESS-CONTINGENT
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES IN
THE CONTEXT OF COLLATERAL
CHALLENGES
Lane v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. 1322 (1982).
I. INTRODUCTION
Last term, the Supreme Court held in Lane v. WilliamsI that state
criminal defendants who attack their sentences because of error occur-
ring at their guilty plea hearings, do not have a stake in the outcome of
their habeas corpus challenges after they have completed their
sentences. The Court was asked to decide whether an Illinois trial court
deprived two defendants of due process of law when the court accepted
their guilty pleas without advising the defendents that their sentences
included a mandatory parole term.2 Both respondents had been re-
leased on parole and were reincarcerated for parole violations. When
the cases reached the Supreme Court, however, the respondents already
had served their sentences and the Court declared the cases moot. 3
The Supreme Court rarely finds criminal cases moot.4 In deciding
whether a case is moot, the critical question is whether there is a possi-
bility that the conviction will have collateral legal consequences.5 In
Lane, collateral legal consequences could have possibly flowed from the
respondents' parole revocations. The respondents' parole violations
could be considered in any subsequent parole determinations, in possi-
ble future criminal sentencing decisions, and in employment decisions.
1 102 S. Ct. 1322 (1982).
2 Id. at 1324.
3 Id. at 1 328.
4 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354
(1957); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211
(1946).
5 One of the first cases to deal with the issue of moomess in a criminal case was St. Pierre
v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943) (per curiam). In St. Pierre, the Supreme Court found the
case to be moot because the petitioner had already served his sentence and consequently there
was no longer a live controvery. 319 U.S. at 42. However, the St. Pierre Court recognized that
a court could adjudicate the merits of a criminal case where, "under either state or federal
law further penalties or disabilities can be imposed. . . as a result of the judgment which has
. . . been satisfied." 319 U.S. at 43. Such "further penalties or disabilities" are now referred
to as collateral legal consequences.
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The Supreme Court dismissed these considerations as inconsequential. 6
In applying the doctrine that an attack on a criminal conviction is not
rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence, however,
the Court in prior cases recognized that similar collateral consequences
keep controversies alive.7 The Court in Lane reversed its position in the
context of an attack on a criminal sentence without giving a satisfactory
explanation for its decision.
II. FACTS OF LANE
In Lane, Lawrence Williams pleaded guilty in an Illinois State court
to a charge of burglary.8 According to the terms of the plea agreement,
Williams agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a reduced sentence of
one to two years in prison.9 Before imposing the sentence, the trial judge
informed Williams of the nature of the charge against him and the con-
stitutional rights that he would waive by pleading guilty. Neither the
trial judge, the prosecutor, nor defense counsel, however, informed Wil-
liams that his negotiated sentence included a mandatory three year pa-
role term. Illinois law required that every indeterminate sentence for
burglary include a parole term with the term of imprisonment.' 0 After
being released from prison on parole, Williams returned to prison as a
parole violator. Williams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that he was not informed of the mandatory parole term until
two months before he was released from prison and that therefore his
return to prison violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Williams did not ask the federal court to set aside his conviction,
but simply requested his immediate release.'1 The circumstances of Os-
6 Lane v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. at 1327-28.
7 For a discussion of the earlier cases, see injfa notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
8 102 S. Ct. at 1323-24.
9 Id. at 1324.
10 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (1982). The mandatory parole requirement was first
imposed by the Illinois legislature in 1972. 1972 Ill. Laws 77-2097, § 5-8-1. When Williams
pleaded guilty, the mandatory parole term for burglary was three years. In 1978, the parole
requirement was amended by the Illinois legislature and reduced to two years. 1978 Ill. Laws
80-1099, § 3. In People v. Wills, 61111. 2d 105, 330 N.E. 2d 505 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
999 (1975), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a mandatory parole term must be explained
to a defendent before a guilty plea can be accepted. The court, however, also held that its
decison should not be applied retroactively. Therefore, before May 19, 1975, when Wills was
decided, there was no state law requirement that a defendant be advised of the parole re-
quirement before pleading guilty.
I I Lane v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. at 1324. The district court found that Williams's guilty
plea had been induced unfairly in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and on January 4, 1978, it ordered Williams released from custody. United
States er rel Williams v. Morris, 447 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Ill. 1978). Williams was not immedi-
ately released from custody, however. The district court entered a stay to allow the State to
file a motion for reconsideration. Before the stay was lifted, Williams was released from
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car Southall's case were similar, and his case was consolidated with that
of Williams. 12
A federal district court granted the petitions for writ of certiorari
and both Williams and Southall were later released from prison.' 3 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded on the
ground that Southall and Williams had failed to exhaust an available
state remedy.14 In the course of its decision, the court reached the issue
of mootness, and concluded that the cases were not moot. 15 The court
reasoned that Southall's mandatory parole term extended beyond the
date of its decision and could be reinstated. Although Williams's parole
term had expired, the court concluded that the controversy was still
alive because adverse collateral consequences could arise from Wil-
liams's having a parole violation on his record. 16 On remand, the dis-
trict court concluded that an intervening decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court rendered the exhaustion claims futile and declared the
parole terms void.' 7 The court of appeals affirmed, 18 but the Supreme
Court vacated the decisions of the lower courts.
prison on a special six month supervisory release term. The district court subsequently denied
the state's motion to reconsider its decision, and the state appealed. Williams's six month
release term ended while the state's appeal was pending, and he was released from custody.
12 102 S. Ct. at 1325. Southall did not allege that he did not know of the parole require-
ment. He simply alleged that "[he] was not previously aware that [he] would be detained on
violation of mandatory parole." Brief for Appellant at 65.
13 The state discharged Southall in compliance with the district court's decision. The
district court's original order for Southall's release was stayed to permit the state to file a
motion for reconsideration. Although the record does not indicate whether there was an or-
der terminating the stay, the court of appeals indicated that Southall had been released pur-
suant to the district court's order. United States ex rel. Williams v. Morris, 594 F.2d 614, 615
(7th Cir. 1979).
14 594 F.2d at 619.
15 Id. at 615.
16 Id The court also found the issue to be capable of repetition yet evading review. It
said: "It is obvious that because of the short terms often remaining in the mandatory parole
terms that the same issue may be expected to be raised as to other petitoners similarly situated
with doubtful expectations of resolution." Id. The Supreme Court answered by saying:
That doctrine, however, is applicable only when there is "a reasonable expectation that
the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." Respondents
are now acutely aware of the fact that a criminal sentence in Illinois will include a spe-
cial parole term; any future guilty plea will not be open to the same constitutional at-
tack. The possibility that other persons may litigate a similar claim does not save this
case from mootness.
102 S. Ct. 1328.
17 United States ex re. Morris v. Williams, 483 F. Supp. 775 (N.D. Ill. 1980). The district
court again entered judgment for the respondents. Since they had already been released from
custody, the court simply entered an order declaring the mandatory parole terms void. Id
18 United States ex rel. Morris v. Williams, 633 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1980).
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III. THE COURT'S RATIONALE
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the majority in Lane.'9 Be-
cause the respondents had elected to have the mandatory parole term
stricken from their sentences, and because they had already served their
terms by the time the cases reached the Court, Justice Stevens declared
the cases moot. Justice Stevens noted that the respondents could have
asked a court to set aside their convictions and grant them an opportu-
nity to plead anew.2 0 If the respondents had chosen this route, they
either could have pleaded not guilty and stood trial or tried to negotiate
a different plea bargain in light of their knowledge that any sentence
they received would include a mandatory parole term. 2 1 If the respon-
dents had chosen to plead anew, the cases would not have been moot
and the respondents would have been freed from all consequences flow-
ing from their convictions. A subsequent trial, however, would have
also subjected them to the possibility of reconviction with a potentially
greater sentence.22
The respondents' decision not to plead anew was, of course, ra-
tional. First, the respondents already had served their sentences. Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court previously had held that if there is any
possibility that collateral legal consequences will flow from a criminal
conviction, then the case is not moot regardless of whether the sentence
had been served.23 Because there were collateral legal consequences
flowing from the respondents' convictions in this case, the respondents
justifiably assumed that their cases were not moot even though they
were not attacking their convictions.
The principle that collateral legal consequences will save a case
from being declared moot was established in Sibron v. New York 24 and in
19 102 S. Ct. at 1323. The Supreme Court found the case to be moot in a six to three
decision. justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun, wrote the dis-
senting opinion. 102 S. Ct. at 1322.
20 Id. at 1326. justice Stevens said that the respondents could have asked the district
court to remedy their alleged wrong in one of two ways. They either could have asked the
district court to set aside their convictions and give them an opportunity to plead anew or
they could have sought relief in the nature of specific enforcement of the plea agreement as
they understood it. Id The latter alternative, which the respondents chose, consisted of the
elimination of the mardatory parole term from the respondents' sentences and therefore re-
moved any possible harmful consequences from the trial court's incomplete advice. See Hen-
derson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
21 102 S. Ct. at 1326.
22 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
23 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354
0957); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211
(1946).
24 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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Carafas v. LaValle.2 5 In Carafas, the petitioner was convicted in a New
York State court of burglary and larceny. Carafas filed a writ of habeas
corpus claiming that illegally obtained evidence had been used against
him. Carafas's sentence had expired by the time his case reached the
Supreme Court. Because he was convicted, Carafas could not engage in
certain businesses, serve as an official of a labor union for a specified
period of time, vote in elections, or serve as a juror. The Supreme Court
determined that these collateral legal consequences gave Carafas a sub-
stantial stake in having his conviction overturned. 26 Less than a month
later, in Sibron, the Court said: "[A] criminal case is moot only if it is
shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences
will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction. ' '27
The majority in Lane recognized that collateral consequences had
attached to the respondents' parole violation and considered whether to
invoke the Carafas and Sbron doctrine. The majority found the doctrine
of Carafas and Sbron inapplicable, however, because the collateral conse-
quences accompanying the respondents' parole violation were not suffi-
cient to bring the doctrine into play.28 Justice Stevens held that the
doctrine of Carafas and Sibron did not apply to Lane because no civil
disabilities like those present in Carafas flow from a finding that an indi-
vidual has violated parole. He found that a return to prison for a parole
violation could have at most only non-statutory consequences, such as
an adverse impact on employment prospects or future criminal sentenc-
ing decisions. The discretionary decisions made by an employer or a
sentencing judge are influenced more by the underlying criminal con-
duct that formed the basis for a parole violation, according to Justice
Stevens, than by the actual parole violation itself. A court order that
simply states that the parole terms are void, therefore, would not remove
any consequences which may flow from the conduct underlying the pa-
role violation.29
Justice Marshall argued in dissent that the majority should not
have inquired into the existence or non-existence of collateral legal con-
sequences, but should have simply presumed that collateral legal conse-
quences would ensue from the convictions for parole violations. 30
Justice Marshall pointed out that the Court simply presumed the exist-
25 391 U.S. 234 (1968). For general background material on S'bron and Carafas, see Com-
ment, The Mootness Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner is Released Prior to Final
Adjudication, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265.
26 391 U.S. at 237.
27 392 U.S. at 57.
28 102 S. Ct. at 1327.
29 Id. at 1327-28.
30 Id. at 1328-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ence of collateral legal consequences in Sibron and Carafas,3' among
other cases, and so argued that precedent dictated a contrary result.
32
In the context of an attack on a parole term, as opposed to an attack on
a conviction, however, the Court refused to make such a presumption in
Lane. Instead, the Court made a cursory examination of Illinois law,
according to Justice Marshall, and found that no significant collateral
legal consequences attached to parole violations in Illinois. 33
Because the majority held that the doctrine of Carafas and Sibron
did not apply, the majority logically could inquire into collateral conse-
quences without having to follow that doctrine's presumption, if indeed
the presumption is an integral part of the doctrine. Since collateral le-
gal consequences may attach to convictions, the presumption is reason-
able. It is not clear, however, that every conviction for parole violations
has collateral legal consequences. Moreover, whether collateral legal
consequences will indeed attach to parole revocations is likely to vary
from state to state. Even if the doctrine of Carafas and Sibron had been
held to apply, therefore, that doctrine would not have compelled the
Court to presume collateral legal consequences. In the Carafas case it-
self, while the Court presumed the existence of collateral legal conse-
quences, the majority was also careful to specifically list the disabilities
which flowed from Carafas's criminal conviction.3 4 The majority, there-
fore, was not departing from prior law when it canvassed state law to
determine the existence or non-existence of collateral legal
consequences.
Justice Marshall was on more solid ground when he criticized the
majority's argument that a court could not remove non-statutory conse-
quences of parole revocations:
The majority makes the unwarranted assumption that declaring void the
parole term upon which a violation is based has no effect because a sen-
tencing judge would consider the conduct underlying the violation, and
not the violation itself, in deciding whether to enhance a sentence. How-
ever, as the majority recognizes, there is no way for this Court to determine
the basis for respondents' parole revocation [under Illinois law] ....
[C]onduct giving rise to a parole violation may be completely innocuous
but for the fact that it was prohibited or required as a condition of parole,
and it may be entirely irrelevant to a sentencing decision once the parole
term is declared void.35
31 Id at 1328. See also Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
32 102 S. Ct. at 1329 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33 Id
34 For a description of these disabilities, see infra text accompanying note 26.
35 102 S. Ct. at 1330 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Marshall added
that it is not clear under Illinois law whether a sentencing judge would consider the conduct
underlying a parole violation that has been voided, even when the conduct was against the
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Moreover, while assuming that an order declaring mandatory parole
terms void could not remove the non-statutory consequences of parole
violations, the majority virtually ignored what can be considered as a
statutory consequence. Justice Marshall pointed out that rules promul-
gated by the Illinois Prisoner Review Board pursuant to an Illinois stat-
ute represent a collateral legal consequence. Under these rules, parole
could be denied simply on the basis of a prior parole violation. 36
Justice Stevens responded to the charge that he had ignored this
statutory consequence. He said that the possibility of a prior parole vio-
lation being the basis for a future parole denial is not sufficient to bring
the case within the doctrine of Carafas.3 7 He pointed out that the peti-
tioner in Carafas faced existing civil disabilities such as being barred
from holding public office, from voting in state elections, and from serv-
ing as a juror.38 The collateral consequences that Justice Marshall said
the majority overlooked in Lane, on the other hand, would only occur if
the respondents subsequently violate state law, are returned to prison,
and become eligible for parole. 39 Since the respondents could prevent
this from occurring, the consequences were not sufficient to save the case
from mootness.4° In addition, Justice Stevens explained that: "[T]he
existence of a prior parole violation does not render an individual ineli-
gible for parole under Illinois law. It is simply one factor, among many,
that may be considered by the parole authority .... 41
Finally, Justice Marshall criticized the majority for blindly follow-
ing the decision of North Carolina v. Rice ,42 in which the Court said that
seeking habeas corpus review to correct a sentence already served is a
law. Id. In similar situations the Illinois appellate courts have held that trial courts may not
consider a reversed conviction in aggravation of new sentences even where the court, in re-
manding for a new trial, noted that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict beyond
a reasonable doubt and the matter was never retried. See, e.g., People v. Chellew, 20 Ill. App.
3d. 963, 313 N.E.2d 284 (2d Dist. 1974). Justice Marshall also noted that the Illinois courts
have held that review of probation revocation is not rendered moot merely because the de-
fendant has served his entire sentence. 102 S. Ct. at 1330. See People v. Halterman, 45 II1.
App. 3d 605, 359 N.E.2d 1223 (1977). Justice Marshall observed that while these cases may
not conclusively demonstrate that a judge would not consider the conduct underlying the
violation of a void parole term in aggravation of sentence, they do cast serious doubt on the
validity of the majority's assumption to the contrary.
36 102 S. Ct. at 1331 (Marshall, J., dissenting).





42 404 U.S. 244 (1971). In Rice, the respondent was convicted of driving while intoxicated
and was fined and sentenced to nine months imprisonment. 404 U.S. at 245. On appeal, he
was tried de novo, found guilty, and given a two year sentence. The district court denied
habeas corpus relief but the court of appeals held that the case was not moot even though
Rice had been discharged. Wood v. Ross, 434 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1970).
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different matter from seeking a nullification of a conviction. The Rice
Court pointed out that the nullification of a conviction has important
benefits for a defendant that do not arise when a sentence that has al-
ready been served is merely corrected. 43 Therefore, the Court held that
petitoner Rice would be resentenced only if it could be shown that he
would benefit under North Carolina law from having his sentence re-
duced after he had already served that sentence. 44 Because the record
before the Court gave no indication of what North Carolina law was,
the Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for reconsideration
of the question of mootness.45
Justice Marshall believed that Lane was distinguishable from Rice
because the respondents in Lane sought more than a mere reduction in
their sentences; they sought to have the parole term declared void in
order to avoid the collateral consequences of their parole violations.46
Furthermore, the Rice Court did not say, as the majority implied, that
habeas corpus review to correct a sentence already served is never per-
mitted. The Rice Court said that a review would be permitted only if it
could be shown that a favorable resentencing would provide important
benefits to the person seeking review.47 In Lane, the petitioners would
have benefitted from the nullification of their parole sentence because
nullification would remove all the collateral consequences flowing from
their parole violations. Therefore, even if Rice did apply, that case
should not preclude the respondents in Lane from seeking habeas corpus
review to correct their sentences.48
43 404 U.S. at 248.
44 In several jurisdictions, if a defendant is adjudicated guilty, and then placed on proba-
tion or given a suspended sentence, statutes imposing disabilities for criminal convictions
have no application. Id. See Special Project, The Collateral Consequences ofa Criminal Conviction,
23 Vand. L. Rev. 929, 954 n.97 (1970). In all other jurisdictions, however, the sentencing
that follows adjudication is irrelevant for purposes of disability status.
45 404 U.S. at 248.
46 102 S. Ct. at 1329 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47 404 U.S. at 248.
48 The majority made a final argument that the respondents had never attacked the find-
ing that they had violated the terms of their parole. Williams sought an order "freeing him
from the present control" of the warden and from "all future liability" under his original
sentence. Southall sought his "immediate release" from custody. Since both respondents had
already been released from prison, the majority argued that they had obtained all relief
sought and that consequently no live controversy remained. 101 S. Ct. at 1328.
The dissent answered this argument by noting that the respondents had requested the
district court to "expunge" the parole terms on which the violations were based. 101 S. Ct. at
1329 n. 1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Such expungement would remove the respondents' parole
violation status and would relieve the respondent of the collateral consequences flowing from
that status. The State of Illinois has a very limited expungement procedure that does not
cover the type of expungement to which the majority referred. Therefore, the respondents
did all that they could to assure that the collateral consequences accompanying their convic-
tion would be removed.
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IV. AN UNSATISFACTORY MOOTNESS RULE
The major problem with the majority's argument is that it ignores
the significance of the collateral consequences attaching to the respon-
dents' parole violations. Justice Stevens attempted to distinguish the
facts in Lane from those in Sibron and Carafas, but his distinction is
unsatisfactory.
Justice Stevens gave four reasons for holding that the collateral le-
gal consequences accompanying a parole violation were not sufficient to
save Lane from mootness. First, a judge considers the conduct underly-
ing the parole violation, and not the violation itself, when sentencing a
defendant for subsequent violations of the law.49 Second, the collateral
consequences in Lane were non-statutory and therefore were distinguish-
able from the statutory consequences in Carafas.50 Third, the collateral
consequences in Lane were only possibilities since they involved discre-
tionary decisions by an employer or a sentencing judge.51 Finally, the
possibility of a prior violation causing a future parole denial could be
avoided by the respondents themselves if they obeyed the law.52 This
casenote analyzes and criticizes the latter three justifications for the out-
come in Lane.
Justice Stevens's distinction between statutory and non-statutory
consequences is meaningless if a court simply can dismiss a statutory
consequence as insufficient because it is a possible rather than an ex-
isting legal disability. The Court's reasoning cannot be reconciled with
the Court's statement in Sibron that a case "is moot only if it is shown
that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be
imposed . . . ,,s5 Further, Sibron merely restates a principle that was
well established in other cases. For example, in Pollard v. United States54
the Court did not inquire into the existence of collateral consequences
but instead presumed their existence. The Court simply said: "The pos-
sibility of consequences collateral to the imposition of sentence is suffi-
ciently substantial to justify our dealing with the merits."' 55 The Pollard
Court clearly set a liberal standard for saving a criminal case from
mootness.
The Supreme Court again followed this liberal standard in Ginsberg
v. New York, 56 holding that:
49 102 S. Ct. at 1327-28.
50 Id. at 1327.
51 Id. at 1327-28.
52 Id. at 1327 n.13.
53 392 U.S. at 57.
-54 352 U.S. 354 (1957).
55 Id. at 358.
56 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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[T]he mere possibility that the Commissioner of buildings of the Town of
Hempstead, New York, might in his discretion attempt in the future to
revoke a license to run a luncheonette because of a single conviction for
selling relatively inoffensive 'girlie' magazines to a 16 year old boy was
sufficient to preserve a criminal case from mootness.
57
Ginsberg clearly indicates that the possibility of an adverse discretionary
decision that imposes a disability will save a case from mootness. The
only distinction between the Pollard and Ginsberg cases and Lane is that
the former involved attacks on convictions rather than on parole terms.
Nowhere does the Court in Lane indicate why the cases should be
treated differently.
The distinction between statutory and non-statutory collateral con-
sequences also makes no sense in light of the purpose of the Carafas and
Sibron doctrine. The doctrine was designed to protect the criminally ac-
cused from disabilities or burdens flowing from a conviction regardless
of whether they arise by statute or not. As Justice Marshall pointed out
in Lane, "the existence of express statutory civil disabilities is not a pre-
requisite to holding that a habeas challenge to a criminal conviction is
not moot."-58 The Court has focused its attention on both statutory and
non-statutory disabilities in saving criminal cases from mootness.5 9
Thus, the purpose of the Carafas and Sibron doctrine is to give those who
have served a prison sentence the opportunity to use both statutory and
non-statutory legal consequences as a basis for attacking their
convictions.
Justice Stevens's argument that the possibility of a future parole
revocation was not a sufficient collateral consequence because the re-
spondents could avoid disobeying the law is also contrary to prior case
law.60 Although the Court has never specifically held that the possibil-
ity of future disabilities by itself is of sufficient consequence to save a
case from mootness, the Court's holdings indicate that a finding of possi-
ble future consequences should be sufficient without a finding of a pres-
ent disability.
In United States v. Morgan,6 1 a convict sought to have a court set
57 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. at 54 n.14 (paraphrasing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
at 633 n.2).
58 102 S. Ct. at 1330 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59 See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 394 (1957); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S.
502 (1954); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
60 The majority never addressed the dissent's point that a judge can consider a parole
violation in aggravation of a sentence. Both Morgan and Sibron held that the possibility of
subsequent convictions carrying heavier penalties is enough of a collateral legal consequence
to save a case from mootness. 346 U.S. at 512-13; 392 U.S. at 55-56. Thus both the possibility
of being denied parole and the possibility of an aggravated sentence were sufficient collateral
legal consequences to require the Court to deal with the merits of the case.
61 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
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aside his federal conviction even though he had served his sentence. He
subsequently had been convicted in a state court of another crime, and
had been given a more severe sentence because of his prior federal con-
viction. There was no indication, however, that his sentence would be
reduced upon invalidation of the prior federal conviction. Still, the
Court held that the case was not moot because:
Although the term has been served, the results of the convictions may per-
sist. Subsequent convictions may carry heavier penalties, civil rights may
be affected. As the power to remedy an invalid sentence exists, we think,
respondent is entitled to an opportunity to attempt to show that this con-
viction was invalid.62
The Court spoke in terms of possibilities, rather than certanties, when it
addressed the heavier criminal penalties and the impairment of civil
rights. The possibility of a subsequent conviction carrying a heavier
penalty is clearly a future consequence, while the possibility of civil
rights being affected could be either present or future. Because the
Court mentioned both a present and a future possible disability, it was
not clear whether either standing alone would be sufficient to prevent a
case from being declared moot.
In Sibron v. New York, 63 however, the Court found that a criminal
case was not moot although petitioner Sibron had already served his
sentence. Sibron was saved from mootness both because the conviction
could be used for character impeachment if Sibron chose to put it in issue
at any future criminal trial, and because the conviction would be con-
sidered in sentencing if Sibron were ever again convicted of a crime.
Both consequences in Sibron were merely possibilities.64 Moreover, either
consequence would be contingent upon the future acts of the habeas
corpus petitioner. Justice Stevens's argument in Lane that the petitioner
can avoid possible future disabilities ignores Sibron as a precedent.
While ignoring Sibron, the majority in Lane focused upon Carafas,
which dealt with present disabilities arising from convictions, and which
implicitly held that present disabilities are more important than future
contingent disabilities. The Lane majority concluded from this that
present disabilities must be present for a petitioner to overcome moot-
ness. Justice Stevens's distinction between present and future conse-
quences, however, appears unjustified. Just because disabilities may be
triggered in the future does not mean that they still are not disabilities.
It should make no difference that future disabilities will be triggered
only if an ex-convict commits another crime. Ex-convicts retain a suffi-
62 Id. at 512-13.
63 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
64 See generallv Comment, supra note 25, which supports the view that the Sibron doctrine
applies to both specific and possible collateral legal consequences.
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cient interest in their cases precisely because they are not on par with
the rest of society in the treatment they will receive if they commit
subsequent criminal offenses.
Under the Court's decision, however, defendants have no habeas
corpus remedy if their disabilities can be triggered only in the future,
whereas those who acquire present disabilities do have a remedy. Be-
cause Justice Stevens made the distinction in the context of habeas
corpus challenges of sentences, it is unclear whether the Court will apply
the distinction in cases involving habeas corpus challenges of
convictions.
V. CONCLUSION
Through Lane, the Supreme Court announced that a live contro-
versy remains only so long as a habeas corpus petitioner who attacks his
or her sentence can demonstrate that substantial present legal conse-
quences stem from the sentence. If collateral consequences operate only
in futuro, for example, at a discretionary decision-making procedure,
then courts will declare the case moot. If collateral legal consequences
are non-statutory, then a court following Lane is more likely to find that
these disabilities are not significant enough to save the case from moot-
ness. Finally, if the petitioner can avoid collateral legal consequences by
living a crime-free life, then it is almost certain that a court will declare
the case moot. It is not clear, however, whether the Supreme Court will
adopt these principles in cases involving habeas corpus challenges of
convictions.
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